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REVIEWS
Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago
Daniel A. Cranet
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark:
The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on US. Antitrust
Edited by Robert Pitofsky. Oxford, 2008. Pp xiv, 309.
INTRODUCTION
Of all of Chicago's law and economics conquests, antitrust was the
most complete and resounding victory. Chicago, of course, is a synec-
doche for ideological currents that swept through and from Hyde Park
beginning in the 1950s and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s.'
From early roots in antitrust and economic regulation, the Chicago
School branched outward, first to adjacent fields like securities regula-
tion, corporate law, property, and contracts, and eventually to more dis-
tant horizons like sexuality and family law.2 Predictably, the Chicago
School exerted its greatest influence in fields closely tied to commercial
regulation. But never did Chicago trounce its ideological opponents as
plainly and lastingly as it did in the field of its early conquests-antitrust.
The Chicago School enjoyed its heyday in the late 1970s as the
Supreme Court began to uproot interventionist antitrust precedents
from the 1950s and 1960s and to replace them with more permissive
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
In light of the subject of this Review, it is perhaps relevant to disclose that the author re-
ceived his JD at the University of Chicago and wrote this Review while a visiting professor at the
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, and Josh Wright for help-
ful comments. All errors are my own.
I See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa
L Rev 925,925-28 (1979).
2 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 2-3 (Harvard 1992). For a discus-
sion of the Chicago School's historical trajectory, see Michael Ansaldi, Book Review, Gossip and
Metaphysics: The Personal Turn in Jurisprudential Writing, 94 Mich L Rev 1517, 1536-37 (1996),
reviewing Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon 1995); John Henry Schle-
gel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill 1995) (chronicling the
transformation of the "old" Chicago School of the 1940s to "new" Chicago School of the 1960s).
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rules.' Then, Ronald Reagan appointed Bill Baxter to head the Anti-
trust Division, and the antitrust agencies began to follow suit. Baxter
was thoroughly Stanford-undergraduate, law degree, and law profes-
sor-and not Chicago, but it has become conventional to lump Baxter
into the Chicago School.' Under his direction, the Justice Department
veered away from interventionist stances on vertical restraints and
mergers, monopolization, and even horizontal mergers Reagan com-
plemented Baxter's appointment by placing a conservative University
of Virginia (but "Chicago School" nonetheless) economist, James Mil-
ler, to chair the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).' Although slightly
more interventionist policies would reemerge in the agencies during
the Clinton Administration, Baxter and Miller's revolution set the
agencies on a durable new path.'
As the antitrust agencies were turning rightward, the Supreme
Court also continued its antitrust retrenchment. As the 1980s became
the 1990s, the Court jettisoned a wide swath of Warren Court prece-
dents. Predatory pricing became a disfavored legal theory;' maximum
resale price maintenance became subject to the rule of reason and
hence de facto legal;9 vertical resale price maintenance became diffi-
3 See, for example, Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 59 (1977) (over-
turning Warren Court precedent and subjecting nonpricevertical constraints to the rule of rea-
son); United States v General Dynamics Corp, 415 US 486, 509-10 (1974) (rejecting the use of
structural presumptions based on post-merger concentration and allowing the merger of coal
mining companies).
4 See John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Exper-
tise in Antitrust Cases, 90 Cornell L Rev 617, 634 (2005) (describing Baxter as a "Chicago-
oriented scholar" and detailing how Justice Lewis Powell wrote the words "Posner, Baxter, Bork"
in his preconference notes in Continental TV).
5 See William E. Kovacic, The Modem Evolution of US Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 Antitrust L J 377,431 n 178 (2003) (collecting sources describing diminished merger control
during the Reagan administration); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr and J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51
Stan L Rev 1187, 1188 (1999) (describing Baxter's termination of the IBM monopolization case and
his general approach to antitrust enforcement), citing In re IBM Corp, 687 F2d 591 (2d Cir 1982).
6 See Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of US. Competition Policy, 2003 Colum Bus L Rev 359, 388 (describing Miller's
appointment and attitude toward antitrust).
7 See J. Thomas Rosch, Antitrust Regulation of Innovation Markets 5-9 (Feb 5, 2009),
online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roschl090205innovationspeech.pdf (visited Oct 20,2009).
8 See, for example, Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209,
227-30 (1993) (holding that predatory pricing schemes are particularly improbable when there is
no proof of cooperation between firms); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp,
475 US 574,588-89 (1986) (holding that predatory pricing schemes are generally implausible and
that in this case no evidence of financial gain suggests that there was no conspiracy).
9 See, for example, State Oil Co v Kahn, 522 US 3, 15-19 (1997) (holding that vertical
maximum price fixing is not subject to the per se rule because it does not harm consumers). See
also Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U Chi L Rev 1, 14 (1977) ("[Tlhe content of the Rule of Reason is largely
unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability.").
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cult to prove; '° and summary judgment became a favored procedural
device in antitrust cases." Still, more work remained to be done in the
2000s, and the Chicago School continued to wreak its vengeance.
Away went the presumption of market power in patent tie-ins,'2 the
duty of a monopolist to deal with competitors," liberal pleading rules
for cartel cases," and, most recently, the ninety-six-year-old rule of per
se illegality for vertical resale price maintenance.'
Chicago had its critics all along, but for decades they were over-
whelmed by the tidal wave of pro-Chicago sentiment in the antitrust
agencies and the courts. As early as the mid-1980s, however, there be-
gan to be talk of a "post-Chicago" school that would wrench antitrust
from Hyde Park. '6 Over the intervening years, scholars have attacked
the Chicago School's ostensible excesses in an emerging body of post-
Chicago critique." Until recently, however, there was almost no con-
solidated body of work summarizing the post-Chicago critiques.'"
Now there is, thanks to efforts of antitrust powerhouse Bob Pi-
tofsky, a Georgetown law professor and former Chair of the FTC. In
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conserva-
tive Economic Analysis on US. Antitrust, Pitofsky has assembled an
all-star cast of economists and law professors to muster the case
10 See, for example, Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corp, 485 US 717,723-36
(1988) (holding that a vertical restraint of trade is not per se illegal unless it includes some
agreement on price levels).
11 See, for example, Matsushita, 475 US at 595-98 (requiring unambiguous evidence of the
alleged conspiracy in order to survive summary judgment).
12 See Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28, 42-43 (2006), overruling
Morton Salt Co v G.S. Suppiger Co, 314 US 488 (1942) (holding that tying arrangements, such as
true-monopoly or market-wide conspiracy involving patented products, must be supported by
proof of power in the market rather than by presumption).
13 See Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, 540 US 398,410-11
(2004) (holding that traditional antitrust principles do not create a duty for monopolists to aid
their competitors).
14 See Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556-57 (2007) (requiring more than a
mere allegation of parallel business conduct to state a claim under the Sherman Act).
15 See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 127 S Ct 2705, 2714-15 (2007)
(holding that because vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices can have a procompeti-
tive effect, a per se rule is unwarranted).
16 Herbert Hovenkamp seems to have been the first scholar to apply the phrase "post-
Chicago" to antitrust law. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 84 Mich L
Rev 213, 225 (1985) (discussing the flaws of the Chicago School and predicting its eventual de-
mise to a post-Chicago school of thought).
17 For example, Bob Pitofsky himself led the charge against the Chicago School's focus on
purely economic objectives for antitrust law in an influential essay in 1979. See generally Robert Pi-
tofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U Pa L Rev 1051 (1979) (arguing that using an exclusively
economic approach to antitrust law is bad policy and that political values should also be considered).
18 One post-Chicago collection presents post-Chicago critiques from a European perspec-
tive. See generally Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh, eds, Post-
Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2002).
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against Chicago. Broadly speaking, How Chicago argues that Chicago
has vastly overstated its anti-interventionist case and reduced antitrust
to near nothingness. Many of the chapter authors darkly hint that
lurking behind the Chicago School arguments is not so much objective
economics as right-wing political ideology.
If nothing else, Pitofsky has succeeded in putting together a valu-
able single volume reference guide to the leading critiques of the Chi-
cago School by some of the most prominent voices in antitrust today.
How valuable a contribution the book will make beyond that depends
in large part on the spirit in which it is taken. There is much insightful,
nuanced, and rigorous substance in this volume that is certainly worth
presenting in composite form. Alas, there is also a fair amount of over-
statement, invective, and polemic. It is as if the book has two intended
audiences-antitrust professionals evaluating technical details of Chi-
cago School arguments in order to understand where Chicago may
have overreached, and a lay audience that needs to be convinced that
the Chicago School is one more cabal in the vast right-wing conspiracy
trying to overthrow American political institutions and create a com-
pletely unregulated free-market state. One fears that, for all of the book's
many virtues, the latter propensity could come to predominate-
particularly for those who adopt the book's cover, introduction, and in-
terchapter introductions as a gestalt for the entire work. After all, if Sena-
tor Herb Kohl's backcover blurb is to be believed, the book reveals "the
excesses of Chicago School economic theory that has led to an overly
hands-off and lifeless approach to antitrust enforcement." Or, if Pi-
tofsky's introduction is to be believed, the Chicago School represents
"extreme interpretations and misinterpretations of conservative econom-
ic theory (and constant disregard of the facts)" and has caused antitrust
in the United States to "head[] in a profoundly wrong direction" (p 6).
I doubt that many of Pitofsky's authors believe that antitrust to-
day is "lifeless" or that US antitrust is "headed in a profoundly wrong
direction." Based on their writings both in this volume and elsewhere,
one would reach the conclusion that the Chicago School has been an
overwhelmingly positive development for antitrust law but that, as
with many paradigmatic movements, it somewhat overstated its case
and needs some correction. Still, it is easy to come away from this
book with a very different impression. Despite many measured and
balanced critiques, ideologically motivated readers (or nonreaders)
will doubtlessly take a composite of the book's shriller turns as a re-
presentation of the entire book and the book itself as a turning point
in the ideological struggle against "conservative economics." Chicago
and post-Chicago deserve a richer dialogue than that.
In this Review, I engage How Chicago as a reader skeptical of its
ideological message but receptive to its constructive suggestions for
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refinements to Chicago School insights. In my skeptical capacity, I ar-
gue that How Chicago overstates the movement's conservatism, influ-
ence, and failures. In my receptive capacity, I accept that many of the
chapter authors offer insightful critiques of Chicago School positions
that should be taken into account in constructing the relevant legal
doctrines and enforcement priorities.
Part I addresses the Chicago School itself I argue that the book ex-
aggerates Chicago's conservatism, often ignores the coincident impact of
other influences (particularly the "Harvard School"), and makes unsubs-
tantiated claims that the Chicago School has made a radical, ideologically
motivated attempt to undermine the very existence of antitrust law.
Part II addresses the post-Chicago School, or at least the post-
Chicago School implicit in the book. It argues that post-Chicago has
largely failed to turn the tide because it has attacked Chicago as ex-
cessively theoretical and speculative without offering any empirical
basis for believing that Chicago theories result in suboptimal market
performance. Post-Chicago tries to one-up Chicagoan theories with
even more attenuated theories of its own, thus announcing the empe-
ror's nudity while wearing clothes cut of the same purportedly invisi-
ble cloth. Further, although darkly hinting that Chicago is little more
than right-wing ideology masquerading as economics, How Chicago
proposes no normative countertheory of antitrust.
Finally, Part III turns to the possibility of a more constructive di-
alogue between Chicago and post-Chicago perspectives. Specifically, it
considers the possibility of a "neo-Chicago School," one sensitive to the
identified failings of the Chicago School yet faithful to its core tenets.
I. CHICAGO
Intellectual "schools" tend to be "Protestant" rather than "Catho-
lic," meaning that there is no central creedal authority to delimit or-
thodoxy and heresy. This is particularly true of a "school" like Chicago,
which is only loosely tied to a geographical locus, spans decades tem-
porally, and involves a score or more of major contributors. Hence, the
first step in reprimanding the Chicago School's overreach is to demar-
cate its boundaries and define its essential characteristics.
How Chicago is organized into six chapters with brief introduc-
tions by Pitofsky. The first chapter-Conservative Economic Analysis
and Its Effects-is intended to serve the demarcation function, to tell
us what Chicago was and what it did. The chapter begins with an essay
by economist Richard Schmalensee that is generally laudatory of Chi-
cago. Economist Irwin Stelzer follows with an explanation of how he
is generally conservative but critical of conservative antitrust. Next,
EM. Scherer locates Chicago's intellectual primogenitors, Tom Kau-
per appraises the influence of conservative economic analysis on the
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development of antitrust law, and Dan Rubinfeld attempts to define
"conservative economics." Rubinfeld nominally rounds out the de-
marcatory essays, but efforts to define Chicago continue throughout
the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, Eleanor Fox explains that con-
servative economics, not efficiency considerations, lurk behind many
recent Supreme Court decisions. Jack Kirkwood and Bob Lande re-
prise Lande's landmark critique of Robert Bork's economic efficiency
interpretation of the Sherman Act's legislative history." Chapter 3
tackles monopolization law, with essays by Herbert Hovenkamp and
Harvey Goldschmid. Chapter 4 addresses vertical arrangements, with
essays by Steve Salop and Steve Calkins. In Chapter 5, Warren Grimes
and Marina Lao come to the aid of Chicago's favorite bogeyman-the
freerider. The book closes in Chapter 6 with an essay (and proposal) on
merger policy by Jon Baker and Carl Shapiro. Throughout, the authors
progressively sculpt an image of the Chicago School and its influences.
The composite portrait that emerges is by and large unattractive.
In an introduction echoed by subsequent voices, Pitofsky asserts that
Chicago manifests
preferences for economic models over facts, the tendency to as-
sume that the free market mechanisms will cure all market imper-
fections, the belief that only efficiency matters, outright mistakes in
matters of doctrine, but most of all, lack of support for rigorous en-
forcement and willingness of enforcers to approve questionable
transactions if there is even a whiff of a defense (p 5).
He then adds that the Chicago School "finds a way of ensuring that
the pro-antitrust position always loses" (p 5).
Two primary propositions about Chicago emerge from the chorus
of voices-first, that it is entirely theoretical and divorced from facts,
and second, that it uniformly favors nonintervention. I reserve judg-
ment on the first proposition for now and tackle the second.
A. Chicago's Noninterventionism
Chicago's noninterventionism is greatly overstated. To be sure,
the strong trend of the Chicago School was to pull back from what
virtually every author in the book would admit were the excesses of
the previous generation. But to say, as Pitofsky does in the introduc-
tion, that "in the 1980s, antitrust enforcement virtually disappeared"
19 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 Hastings L J 871, 892-910 (1999) ("[N]o evidence
has ever been found to suggest that any legislator understood that monopoly pricing causes
allocative inefficiency.").
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(p 5) or, as Goldschmid does, that today "[a]lmost nothing is happen-
ing at the Antitrust Division, at the FTC, or in the courts in the sec-
tion 2 area [of the Sherman Act]" (p 127)," or, as many of the authors
assume, that Chicago is uniformly hostile to antitrust interventions, is
a very significant exaggeration.
To be sure, support can be found among individual Chicago
School adherents for various views, which, if taken in composite,
would equate to near-total nonintervention. But this is much like tak-
ing a composite of the views of Senators Bob Casey on abortion, Jim
Webb on gun control, and Ben Nelson on a federal marriage amend-
ment and hence characterizing Senate Democrats as anti-abortion,
pro-guns, and anti-gay. A "school" should not be characterized by its
outliers but by its center. The broad current of the Chicago School
advocated judicious intervention, but intervention nonetheless.
If one wants to identify a Chicago School centrist, there is no
more representative scholar than Richard Posner. Although the gen-
eral trend of Posner's antitrust work has been less interventionist than
the views of the previous epoch, in important ways Posner's work has
supported enhanced intervention. Posner has advocated finding cartel
violations from mere "conscious parallelism,"2' argued for a long-run
marginal-cost test for predatory pricing (more favorable to plaintiffs
than the short-run test proposed by Harvard Schoolers Phillip Areeda
and Donald Turner),' rejected using restrictive predatory-pricing rules
to govern bundled discounts,3 articulated concerns over vertical forec-
losure,2 rejected a "free riding" argument that Grimes and Lao claim
20 For example, the FrC brought a high-profile monopolization enforcement action against
Rambus over the latter's alleged deception of a Standard Setting Organization (SSO) with re-
spect to its patents and patent applications. See Rambus, Inc v FTC, 522 F3d 456, 459 (DC Cir
2008). It settled by consent decree a similar action concerning SSOs and patent rights. See In re
Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 258308, *6 (FTC). The FrC recently launched a monopoli-
zation investigation of Intel concerning its marketing tactics with respect to microprocessors. See
Joe Nocera, A.M.D. and Its War with Intel, NY Times C1 (June 21,2008).
21 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan
L Rev 1562, 1575 (1969).
22 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 217-23 (Chicago 2d ed 2001) (describing how a
short-run marginal-cost test is not a useful remedy against predatory pricing), citing Phillip
Areeda and Donald E Thrner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697, 716-18 (1975).
23 Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U Chi L Rev 229, 239-40
(2005) (suggesting that bundling discounts can be explained by nonexclusionary measures such
as price discrimination).
24 See JTC Petroleum Co v Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc, 190 F3d 775, 778-79 (7th Cir 1999)
(Posner) (noting that a cartel could injure a rogue competitor by preventing upstream producers
from selling to those outside the cartel).
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Chicagoans reflexively accept,' and argued that price discrimination
may be, on average, output reducing." Surely, these are not the views
of an antitrust abolitionist.
At times, the How Chicago authors try to minimize Chicago's an-
titrust commitment by belittling those enforcement schemes that Chi-
cagoans do support. For example, Scherer complains that Chicagoans
only support intervention to correct market structure when governmen-
tal intervention has created market dislocations (pp 36-37). Baxter's
breakup of AT&T is an example of such an influence. But surely the
fact that the Chicagoan Baxter accomplished the most far-reaching
structural remedy in history counts against the view that Chicago seeks
to abolish antitrust-even if Chicago's reasons for intervention center
on the evils of the government's regulatory role in telecommunications.
A similar overstatement relates to the levels of enforcement by Chi-
cago-oriented enforcement agencies. For example, Pitofsky repeats the
oft-made claim that "in the 1980s, antitrust enforcement virtually disap-
peared" (p 5). In a recent study, I showed that Department of Justice anti-
trust case filings, adjusted for GDP, were roughly constant during the
Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations.: Critics com-
plain that the total number of case filings during the Reagan administra-
tion is misleading, since the Reagan Justice Department "piled on" by
filing repetitive cartel cases and ignored other aspects of enforcement.-
But it is one thing to disagree with Chicago's enforcement priorities and
another thing altogether to pretend that Chicago has none.
B. Chicago and Harvard
One of the book's recurrent themes is to blame the Chicago
School for the Supreme Court's antitrust retrenchment in recent dec-
ades. To be sure, no plaintiff has won an antitrust case in the Supreme
Court since 1992." But to "blame" this unqualifiedly on "conservative
economics" is a gross overstatement. As scholars have shown (and, to
be fair, a few of Pitofsky's authors acknowledge), recent antitrust de-
25 See General Leaseways, Inc v National Truck Leasing Association, 744 F2d 588, 593-94
(7th Cir 1984) (Posner) (rejecting the freerider argument because the members of National
Truck Leasing charge each other for their services).
26 Posner, 72 U Chi L Rev at 235 (cited in note 23) ("The effect of price discrimination on
economic welfare may be generally negative.").
27 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 Tex L Rev 1159,1174-77 (2008).
28 See id at 1176 n 77.
29 The last time a plaintiff won was in Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc,
504 US 451, 462-63 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs had presented enough evidence of a tying
arrangement to survive a summary judgment motion).
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cisions on the Supreme Court have been at least as much influenced
by the Harvard School as by the Chicago School."
As FTC Chair Bill Kovacic has written regarding single-firm con-
duct but with application to antitrust as a whole,
the intellectual DNA of U.S. antitrust doctrine governing single-
firm conduct today is not exclusively or predominantly a single
strand of Chicago School ideas. Rather, the intellectual DNA of
modern U.S. antitrust doctrine is chiefly a double helix that con-
sists of two intertwined chains of ideas, one drawn from the Chi-
cago School of Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easter-
brook, and the other drawn from the Harvard School (HS) of
Phillip Areeda, Donald Turner, and Stephen Breyer."
Whereas the Chicago School tends to argue for the robustness of
markets and hence for minimal need for regulatory interventions, the
Harvard School tends to focus on the institutional limitations of go-
vernmental actors-regulators, judges, and juries-to correct even real
market failures. Conjunctively, the two schools often tend toward simi-
lar noninterventionist results.
Consider Stephen Breyer. Before joining the Court, Breyer worked
in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, taught antitrust at
Harvard, and decided several pro-defendant and highly influential anti-
trust cases as a First Circuit judge." Since Breyer joined the Court in 1994,
the Supreme Court has decided fourteen antitrust cases. In those cases,
there have been 108 votes for the majority position and only 14 votes in
dissent. Breyer has only been on the losing side twice, as often as Cla-
rence Thomas. In all fourteen cases, the defendant won. Surely, a "con-
servative" breeze is wafting on the Court. But from Hyde Park?
The best explanation for Breyer's voting pattern is an institutio-
nalist perspective on comparative competence in decisionmaking.
30 See Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 Comp Policy Intl 59, 60 (2007) (discussing how the recent Supreme
Court antitrust decisions were influenced by the more moderate Harvard School approach as
opposed to the Chicago School).
31 Wiliam E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modem US. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1,13-14 (characterizing
each school of thought as working in conjunction, with Chicago contributing "substantive theories
... involving dominant firm conduct" and Harvard cautioning "about the administrability of legal
rules and the capacity of the institutions entrusted with implementing them").
32 See, for example, Town of Concord v Boston Edison Co, 915 F2d 17, 22 (1st Cir 1990)
(rejecting a price squeeze claim where utility was regulated at both the primary and secondary
level); Barry Wright Corp v ITT Grinnell Corp, 724 F2d 227, 235-36 (1st Cir 1983) (rejecting
predatory-pricing and exclusive-dealing claims).
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Breyer leans toward technocracy,33 and probably brings other justices
with him. In two much-criticized cases in which Breyer joined (or au-
thored) the majority opinion, one could plausibly understand the deci-
sion to withdraw antitrust intervention as a preference for regulatory
decisionmaking by administrative agencies-by the FCC in Verizon
Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko" and by the
SEC in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v Billing.5 In the two cases in
which Breyer dissented, his reasons may have had less to do with a
belief that the Chicago School majority had excessive confidence in
markets than a conviction that the majority approach would entrust
decisionmaking to comparatively less competent decisionmakers. In
California Dental Association v FTC," Breyer's dissent leaned on the
comparative advantage of the FTC in ascertaining what kinds of ad-
vertising were false or misleading.7 In Leegin Creative Leather Prod-
ucts, Inc v PSKS, Inc,8 Breyer advocated the use of rules rather than
standards on the ground that juries may have difficulty applying open-
ended, economically dense standards.9
Chicago School thinking has had a considerable impact on the
Supreme Court, but it is only one part of the story. Perhaps the most
significant predictor of antitrust outcomes today-the most accurate
bellwether of Supreme Court sentiment-is the Areeda-Hovenkamp
antitrust treatise, which is currently in the sole custody of Herbert
Hovenkamp. ° If one is to criticize the recent pro-defendant turn in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, one might as well write a book entitled,
How the Neo-Harvard School Overshot the Mark.
C. Chicago's Radical Agenda?
As noted at the outset, there is a significant tension within How
Chicago between Pitofsky's apparent goal-of providing a systematic,
ideological case against radical Chicago overreaching-and what his au-
33 See Ken I. Kersch, Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U Chi L Rev 759,760-61 (2006)
(describing Justice Breyer's technocratic outlook).
34 540 US 398, 411-12 (2004) (maintaining that because there was already a regulatory
scheme in place, any additional benefit provided by antitrust laws would "tend to be small").
35 US 264, 275 (2007) (holding that where a regulatory scheme is in place, courts must
determine whether it is clearly incompatible with antitrust law).
36 526 US 756 (1999).
37 Id at 787 (Breyer dissenting).
38 127 S Ct 2705 (2007).
39 Id at 2730 (Breyer dissenting) ("One cannot fairly expect judges and juries in such cases
to apply complex economic criteria without making a considerable number of mistakes.").
40 See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 Mich L Rev 1193, 1208-09 (2007) (noting
that Hovenkamp's theories on patents and tying, the essential facilities doctrine, and possibly, per se
illegality for minimum retail price maintenance have become popular in the Supreme Court).
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thors are actually willing to say. Many of his authors are willing to articu-
late specific points of disagreement with Chicago School tenets but are
unwilling to sound the alarm bells that the book advertises. Sometimes,
Pitofsky uses the introductory blurbs between chapters to hint at the ex-
pos6 to come, only to have the expos6 fall considerably short of its billing.
At times the mismatch between the introductory blurbs and
chapters becomes absurd. For example, the introduction to Chapter 3
asserts that "Hovenkamp next turns to the question of whether there
can be a 'general theory' of monopolization, an obsessive recent con-
cern of conservative antitrust officials" (p 107). To be sure, in recent
years there has been an active-perhaps even "obsessive"--search for
a unifying theory of monopolization law of which I, among others,
have been critical.4 ' But there is no basis for claiming that this obses-
sion is part of the conservative plot, and Hovenkamp certainly does
not say so. One of the leading "unifying theory" articles was written by
Harvard law professor Einer Elhauge, the head of Barack Obama's
Antitrust Advisory Committee during the 2008 presidential campaign
and the author of an article attacking the Chicago School perspective
on tying and price discrimination. 2 Steve Salop, who critiques Chica-
go's approach to vertical exclusion in Chapter 4, has written another
"unifying theory" article proposing a "consumer welfare" test. The
Hovenkamp chapter that follows the "obsessive recent concern" in-
troductory blurb rejects any "single test" for monopolization but then
proposes a unifying test with two parts, three subparts, and an addi-
tional consideration (p 118). The "unifying theory" bug has bitten
scholars and practitioners across the ideological spectrum.
A brief anecdote illustrates the irony of the "obsessive recent
concern" comment. During the summer of 2004, an antitrust sympo-
sium was held at (where else?) the University of Chicago. Hovenkamp
presented a paper entirely devoted to defining a general test for mo-
nopolization." During the discussion period, Richard Posner asked,
41 See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L
J 423,463-64 (2006) (analyzing the shortcomings of verbal formulations as applied to mixed bundling).
42 See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan L Rev 253, 320
(2003) (characterizing the antitrust doctrine as relying "on a market process that allows mono-
polists to reap whatever gains they can by efforts to improve their own efficiency, while subject-
ing them to the constant counter-pressure that their rivals will be trying to do the same"). The
article critiquing the Chicago School perspective on tying and price discrimination is Einer El-
hauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv
L Rev (forthcoming 2009).
43 See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust L J 311, 314 (2006) (claiming that the "consumer welfare" stan-
dard leads to decreased overdeterrence and underdeterrence, relative to its competitors).
44 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U Chi L Rev 147
(2005) (summarizing the shortcomings of current generalized formulations of exclusionary conduct).
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roughly, why everyone was so intent on articulating a general theory
of monopolization and suggested that a case-by-case approach to mo-
nopolization offenses might be satisfactory. Pitofsky was also in atten-
dance. It now seems that he concurs with Posner's assessment of the
unifying theory obsession, for which Pitofsky blames ... the Chicago
School, relying for support on a chapter written by Hovenkamp
(which provides no such support).
In fact, while Hovenkamp articulates various thoughtful disa-
greements with Chicago School tendencies, it would be very difficult
to take his neo-Harvard School perspective as a broad-based repudia-
tion of the Chicago School.' For example, it is conventional wisdom
that there has been one-and only one-"post-Chicago" antitrust de-
cision in the Supreme Court." In Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technic-
al Services, Inc,7 the Court allowed a claim by independent service
organizations (ISOs) that Kodak illegally tied its monopoly over Ko-
dak-branded parts to service for Kodak copy machines." Kodak made
a "Chicago School" argument that since the primary market-the
market for copy machines-was admittedly competitive, it was im-
possible for there to be anticompetitive effects in the service after-
market.' The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Kodak might
have been able to exploit customer lock-in and failures of perfect in-
formation in purchasing decisions to obtain monopoly power in the
aftermarket even though it lacked such power in the primary market.'
There has been no more vociferous critic of this post-Chicago rul-
ing than Hovenkamp, who asserts that "Kodak was a failed experi-
ment in a type of economic engineering where antitrust has no
place."' Significantly, Hovenkamp's argument against Kodak was not
merely that the Court erred in some technical detail but that the en-
tire enterprise of using antitrust to police post-contract market power
attributable to consumer lock-in is misguided. Indeed, much of Ho-
venkamp's recent book (in the tradition of Posner and Bork) argues
for continued curtailment of antitrust law. Consider the following
summary statement: "At all times we must remember that if we be-
45 I have referred to the neo-Harvard School as "Chicago lite." Crane, 105 Mich L Rev at
1194 (cited in note 40) (categorizing the "new Harvard" school as "Chicago lite" because it "ac-
cepts the essential theoretic insights of the Chicago School but acts cautiously in applying them
to real cases because of skepticism over the predictive power of theoretic models in litigation").
46 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise Principle and Execution 98 (Harvard 2005).
47 504 US 451 (1992).
48 Id at 455,477.
49 Id at 467.
50 Id at 473-77.
51 Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise at 310 (cited in note 46) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should overrule Kodak).
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lieve that markets generally work well when left alone, then interven-
tion is justified only in the relatively few cases where the judiciary can
fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, or more quickly than the
market can fix itself.' O2 This could easily have been the summation for
Posner's 1976 Antitrust Law or Bork's 1978 The Antitrust Paradox.3
It is difficult to understand why Pitofsky has included a chapter
by Hovenkamp in a book that is supposedly testifying to the "pro-
foundly wrong" direction of current US antitrust law. Despite some
disagreements at the margin, Hovenkamp believes that "the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts are generally about where they should be
in defining [section] 2 standards" (p 112). Even Goldschmid, who pro-
vides a comment on Hovenkamp's essay, acknowledges that the "cur-
rent permissiveness" may have as much to do with a "chastised Har-
vard School" (p 123)-for example, Hovenkamp and Breyer-as it
does with "the conservatives." Where, then, is the support for the
statement in Pitofsky's chapter introduction that "[o]ne of the most
remarkable developments in recent years is hostility to section 2 en-
forcement by conservative scholars and in language in judicial deci-
sions" (p 107)? Anyone wanting to cite How Chicago as a searing in-
dictment of the Chicago School or "conservatives" had better read not
only the introductions and cover blurbs, but also the chapters.
II. POST-CHICAGO
Beyond the suggestion that Chicago represents a right-wing power
grab rather than sound economic thinking, the major criticism emerging
from How Chicago is that Chicago is too theoretical, simple, speculative,
and unempirical. Thus, Kauper complains of the "disparity between
Chicago's model and provable facts" and suggests that Kodak involves
a case of "provable facts" trumping Chicagoan speculation (p 47). Fox
argues that Chicago speculated that predatory pricing could happen
rarely, if ever, whereas "[s]cholarship establishes, to the contrary, that
selective price predation is a recurring phenomenon" (p 82). Calkins
argues that "[t]here is a lot of speculating about the effects of exclusive
dealing but not nearly enough empirical research" (p 167).
52 Id at 124.
53 See generally Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago
1976); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books 1978).
54 Again, in conflict with the ideas of Harvardian Hovenkamp, who believes that Kodak
"turns antitrust into a free-ranging engine for repair of any contract that either deceives or has
not taken every possible contingency into account" and "is not merely legally incorrect" but also
"extremely dangerous as a policy matter." Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise at 99, 101 (cited
in note 46).
2009] 1923
The University of Chicago Law Review
So Chicago is unempirical. What does post-Chicago offer to take
its place? The answer is: not much so far.
A. Post-Chicago Empiricism?
Empiricism has roughly three lives in How Chicago. The first is a
recognition by several authors that the paleo-Harvard, pre-Chicago
"structure, conduct, performance" paradigm of the 1960s was highly
empiricist and ultimately a failure (pp 13, 54, 237). The second life is
actually a death-the absence of empiricism in Chicago School scho-
larship. The third life is the vague suggestion that post-Chicago--or
whatever it is that is now supposed to replace Chicago-has more rea-
listic, worldly insights to offer.
This third life is kept vague because post-Chicago's empiricism is
thin. For all of the complaining about Chicago's armchair speculation,
post-Chicago offers precious little empirical demonstration that Chi-
cago School theories have led to underperforming markets, enhanced
market power, or consumer harm. Take, for example, Fox's previously
cited assertion that "[s]cholarship establishes, to the contrary, that se-
lective price predation is a recurring phenomenon" (p 82). The sup-
port for this assertion is an article that relies primarily on game theory
to claim that predation could be plausible under specified conditions."
There is little "demonstration" that predatory misbehavior leads to
monopoly pricing; instead, there is mostly hypothesizing over how this
could happen given idiosyncratic assumptions and case studies that
provide illustrations for the theoretical models without robustly estab-
lishing the existence of predation." Nonetheless, this hypothesizing
was enough for the United States Court of Appeals of the Tenth Cir-
cuit to say that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's adoption of a
skeptical Chicago School approach about predatory pricing in the
55 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Stra-
tegic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Georgetown L J 2239,2262 (2000).
56 Patrick Bolton, Joseph Brodley, and Michael Riordan mention a clash between two
empirical studies: Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr and Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 Tex L Rev 655, 699-708 (1982), and Roland H.
Koller, II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing:An Empirical Study, Antitrust L & Econ Rev 105,112
(Summer 1971). They then provide various theoretical models of reputational or financial-
market predation and illustrate their theories with several case studies. However, the case studies
do not establish that predation actually happened-only that it could have happened. For exam-
ple, their report on a case study regarding a cable system monopolist in Sacramento notes that
the incumbent monopolist engaged in "drastic" price-cutting in response to new entry, Bolton,
Brodley, and Riordan, 88 Georgetown L J at 2292-93 (cited in note 55), but that is exactly what
we would expect a monopolist would do in response to new entry. The authors acknowledge that
"the case study does not analyze the issue of below-cost pricing," and therefore can only specu-
late as to the critical liability issue in the case. Id at 2298-99.
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1980s and 1990s, it would not approach predatory pricing claims "with
the incredulity that once prevailed.""
Perhaps the most detailed empirical work on predatory pricing
was done by a Chicagoan, John Lott (of More Guns, Less Crime'
fame) who took the assumptions posited by the game theoreticians as
necessary for predation to work and analyzed whether those assump-
tions were present in cases of alleged predation." Lott concluded that
they were not.6' Although Lott's methodologies and findings have
been subject to criticism, ' post-Chicago has not rushed in to provide a
systematic empirical demonstration that predation works. Overall,
Easterbrook's observation continues to stand: theories about predato-
ry pricing are so variegated "for the same reason that 600 years ago
there were a thousand positions on what dragons looked like.
' 62
Another case in point is Baker and Shapiro's concluding chapter
on merger policy. Baker and Shapiro devote three pages to criticizing
the Department of Justice's 2006 clearance of Whirlpool's acquisition
of Maytag (pp 248-50). But while they offer a persuasive theoretical
case for concerns over the merger, they do not offer any evidence of
actual anticompetitive effects resulting from this merger or any other.
To be sure, merger review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's pre-
merger notification system is almost all prospective, and its analytical
tools must therefore be predictive rather than actual.6 But for a school
of thought that criticizes Chicago for being overly theoretical and spe-
culative, post-Chicago offers little empiricism. Where is the rigorous
empirical demonstration that Chicago School thinking has led to ex-
cessive laxity in antitrust controls and therefore to competitively un-
derperforming markets?
For instance, one would expect to see the ostensibly empiricist
post-Chicago Schoolers offering a systematic body of merger retros-
pectives linking increased prices and reduced innovation or quality to
overly permissive merger-control theories at the antitrust agencies or
the courts. In fact, it is the "Chicago School" agencies themselves that
57 United States v AMR Corp, 335 F3d 1109,1115 (10th Cir 2003).
58 See generally John R. Lott, Jr, More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-
Control Laws (Chicago 2d ed 2000).
59 See John R. Lott, Jr, Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts
Believe? 59-60 (Chicago 1999).
60 See generally id.
61 See generally, for example, David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, Review, Are
Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?, 67 U Chi L Rev 271 (2000), reviewing Lott, Are
Predatory Commitments Credible? (cited in note 59).
62 Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev 263, 264
(1981).
63 See 15 USC § 18a(a) (explaining the premerger notification and waiting period re-
quirements).
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are increasingly conducting such retrospectives. On Whirlpool's acqui-
sition of Maytag, the Department of Justice conducted a two-year re-
trospective and found that residential washer and dryer prices had
trended downward since the deal closed even though the input costs
of materials had skyrocketed and quality (as measured by energy effi-
ciency) had increased."
The methodology used in the Whirlpool-Maytag retrospective
has been subject to criticism, and it would be an overstatement to
claim that the retrospective proves that the merger was pro-
competitive. As a general matter, great care has to be taken with such
retrospectives. Senior Justice Department officials have cautioned that
such analyses need to consider both agency predictions and market
outcomes in order to be effective. 6 Baker and Shapiro's criticisms
might be considered predictively accurate in the sense that there was a
high probability of anticompetitive effects and yet those anticompeti-
tive effects never materialized due to intervening events. Neither Chi-
cagoans nor post-Chicagoans have the right to say "I told you so"
based on the outcome of any single merger. Nonetheless, post-Chicago
critiques would be much more powerful if they were tied to empirical
showings of systemic failure in Chicago School predictions. Otherwise,
accusations that Chicago is overly theoretical and speculative seem
like the pot calling the kettle black.
How Chicago offers one compelling empirical study (or group of
studies) in possible conflict with a Chicago tenet. As Marina Lao
notes, between 1937 and 1975, Congress allowed states to opt into
"fair trade" laws effectively legalizing vertical resale price mainten-
ance (RPM) (p 210). Empirical studies showed that retail prices
tended to be higher in "fair trade" states than in states where RPM
continued to be illegal (p 210). This does not necessarily prove that
RPM is harmful to consumers-the higher prices in "fair trade" states
could be attributable to enhanced quality or service at retail (the free-
riding story that Grimes and Lao reject). But it is the kind of evidence
that one would expect the post-Chicago School to adduce in order to
64 See Thomas 0. Barnett, Current Issues in Merger Enforcement: Thoughts on Theory,
Litigation Practice, and Retrospectives (June 26, 2008), online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/234537.htm (visited Apr 7, 2009) (noting that consum-
ers likely benefited from the Maytag-Whirlpool merger, but that merger retrospectives are diffi-
cult to conduct ex post).
65 See Dennis W. Carlton, The Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do
It (DOJ working paper No EAG 07-15 2007), online at
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1075707 (visited Apr 7, 2009). At the time he
wrote this article, Dennis Carlton was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge of econom-
ics at the Antitrust Division. And, yes, Carlton is an economics professor at the University of
Chicago, Booth School of Business.
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advance its case for a more empirically founded, interventionist anti-
trust. Post-Chicago will have to do better than a few thirty-year-old
studies about RPM to make its case convincing.
B. Nonintervention as the Default
Post-Chicago's failure to demonstrate that Chicago School rea-
soning has actually made things worse for consumers, or that some
alternative vision would make things better, is an important reason
that post-Chicago theories have gained so little traction thus far. One
can understand why this is frustrating to post-Chicagoans. Chicago
offers a theoretical model, post-Chicago offers a countermodel that is
just as elegant, and Chicago persistently wins the duel. Why do all of
the bounces go Chicago's way?
The answer is that, for now at least, nonintervention is the default
rule. If pro-intervention and anti-intervention models duel one another
into a stalemate, very few judges or enforcement officials will side with
intervention. Enforcement is costly and there is a general sense that mar-
ket dislocations are more quickly corrected than legal dislocations. The
Chicago School has the advantage of offering solutions that are not only
simple theoretically, but simple practically. Doing nothing is much easier
than constructing the remedy to a complex and contested liability finding.
Much of How Chicago has a flavor of "Chicago says x but y could
be true." As long as this remains the case, post-Chicago will have
trouble gaining traction. Ties go to the status quo, particularly if the
status quo is nonintervention.
For example, Salop explains how vertical integration can be effi-
ciency enhancing because it eliminates double marginalization, but
that such integration can also "be anticompetitive by reducing or eli-
minating the potential for entry" (p 149). Indeed, the efficiencies may
be the very source of the anticompetitive effect. If firms eliminate
double marginalization through vertical integration and therefore offer
lower prices, it may become necessary for rival firms to vertically inte-
grate in order to remain price-competitive-and this condition creates
an entry barrier by requiring costly simultaneous entry at two levels of
the market. This may all be perfectly true, but it is not the sort of argu-
ment that is likely to turn courts or enforcers against Chicago because
Chicago is overly theoretical. Without any sense of how much weight to
put on either side of the scale-which requires some empirical showing-
courts and agencies will likely continue to default to nonintervention.
C. "Conservative Economics" as Covert Ideology
One can easily come away from portions of How Chicago with
the impression that the Chicago School's "conservative economics"
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are not so much an honest mistake on the merits as a cover for a right-
wing deregulatory political agenda. In this view, conservative ideolo-
gues co-opted the vocabulary of economics in order to justify nonin-
terventionist policies, which explains why the movement's economics
are so shallow and misapplied. "Conservative economics" thus be-
comes to antitrust what "the Framer's intent" is to some perspectives
on constitutional law-an ostensibly neutral and objective methodol-
ogy used to disguise the proponent's political preferences.
Let us assume for a moment that this view has some merit and
that How Chicago has exposed portions of "conservative economics"
as a fraud. What then? How Chicago does not suggest a counteride-
ology as a candidate for replacing Chicago.
To the antitrust outsider, this may appear inconsequential. Chica-
go advanced an anti-interventionist agenda, and rejection of Chicago
could simply lead back to more intervention. The problem with this
view is that not one of the How Chicago authors wants to pick up
where we left off pre-Chicago. As Pitofsky acknowledges in the intro-
duction, "Virtually all [of his authors] share the view that U.S. antitrust
enforcement, as a result of conservative economic analysis, is better
today than it was during the Warren years" (p 5). He later adds that
"[i]t is unanimous that conservative economic analysis ... demolished
some aspects of the antitrust approach of the 1950s and 1960s (Warren
Court period) and eventually displaced it with a more rigorous ap-
proach" (p 7). Going back is not an option.
The ultimate failure of How Chicago (and the post-Chicago
School more generally) is the absence of a unified normative vision to
contend with Chicago's implicit ideological assumptions. If Pitofsky is
right to sound the alarm bell-to call out Chicago's covert right-wing
agenda-it will not do to publish a book that takes technical pot-shots
at Chicago School policy positions and darkly hints that radical Chica-
goans favor complete abolition. What is needed is an expression of a
strong normative position on why antitrust law should exist and what
its limits are, who its intended beneficiaries are, how conflicts between
different stakeholders should be mediated, how more vigorous en-
forcement is consistent with broader political values, and how anti-
trust should be implemented given political and institutional con-
straints.6 In short, a comprehensive normative vision needs to be arti-
66 To be sure, many of the authors in the post-Chicago camp-including many of the How
Chicago authors-have offered answers to some of these questions. For instance, Pitofsky and
Baker have written two of the leading papers arguing that antitrust analysis should explicitly
factor in political considerations. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U
Pa L Rev 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing that it is "bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude
certain political values in interpreting antitrust laws"); Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as
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culated and defended. If post-Chicago has thus far failed to gain trac-
tion, it is because its major contribution has been to grouse about Chi-
cago rather than to articulate a clear and appealing vision about what
antitrust should do and why.
III. NEO-CHICAGO
Despite my previously identified disagreements with How Chica-
go's ideological tenor and many of its specific assertions, there is no
doubt that post-Chicago views have provided valuable criticisms and
refinements of Chicago School positions. An example not discussed in
the book is a pair of amicus curiae briefs by prominent economists
and law professors addressing the regulation of contractual tie-ins
using patents and the related problem of second-degree price discrim-
ination. 7 Although the briefs ultimately failed to persuade the Su-
preme Court to retain its pre-Chicago presumption of market power
for patent tie-ins,6' the briefs provided targeted critiques of Chicago's
"one monopoly" argument on tie-ins and its sometimes undifferen-
tiated embrace of price discrimination. As such advocacy and scholar-
ship continues, it is likely to provide an increasing challenge to Chica-
goan positions, even if it fails to offer a broad ideological riposte to
the Chicago School writ large.
In this Part, I provide a brief roadmap for a Chicago School re-
sponse to this increasing drumbeat of dissent. Already, there is talk of
a neo-Chicago School, one that accepts Chicago's basic premises as
refined by the emerging body of criticism.6 The success of this neo-
Chicago School depends critically on replenishing Chicago's intellec-
tual stock, providing empirical support for Chicago School theories,
and renewing the case for Chicago's "articles of faith."
Political Bargain, 73 Antitrust L J 483, 484 (2006) (advocating that antitrust should be viewed as
a political bargain between courts, consumers, and producers). What is lacking, however, is a
unified post-Chicago normative account of antitrust law and a roadmap for its implementation.
67 See Brief of Professor EM. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois
Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, No 04-1329, *2-3 (Fed Cir filed Sept 28,2005) (available on
Westlaw at 2005 WL 24276420); Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sulli-
van as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, No
04-1329, *24 (Fed Cir filed Sept 28,2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 2427646).
68 See Illinois Tool, 547 US at 46 (holding that a plaintiff alleging unlawful tying must
prove that a defendant had market power in the tying market and may no longer rely on pre-
sumption that presence of a patent in the tying market confers market power).
69 See David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unila-
teral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U Chi L Rev 73, 75 (2005) (defining a "neo-
Chicago" approach that "accepts the Chicago tenet that legal rules" should be assed "in terms of
efficiency," but also makes use of "post-Chicago insights in designing these rules").
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A. Replenishing the Intellectual Stock
This is a propitious time to be a post-Chicago scholar. Chicago's
intellectual edifice is in a state of neglect. Its erstwhile paladins are
largely dead, bored with the field, or complacent. Some, like Posner
and Easterbrook, continue to offer the occasional, infrequent antitrust
intervention, but without the zeal of their earlier years. By and large, the
view seems to be that what needed to be said was said and the field is
by and large where it should be. Others, most notably Bork, appear to
have been seduced by the "dark side." In 1998, Bork became a paid
mouthpiece for Netscape in its war with Microsoft, explaining that
"[o]nly a knee-jerk conservative would say that there's never a case for
antitrust.'" The fire has gone out of the Chicago School.
Meanwhile, post-Chicago is lean, hungry, and spoiling for a fight.
Post-Chicagoans realize that Chicagoans and their neo-Harvard allies
will continue to dominate the Supreme Court for some time. But there
are plenty of opportunities to score points in the antitrust agencies
and in the lower courts. Over the past few decades the Supreme Court
has shown relatively little interest in antitrust cases, granting certiorari
in about one case a year (many of which raise relatively unimportant
technical matters such as whether the Post Office can be sued under
the Sherman Act'). The Supreme Court has refused to review a num-
ber of controversial pro-plaintiff lower court decisions," thus allowing
a body of post-Chicago lower court law to incubate.
Perhaps more importantly in the long run is the drumbeat of
post-Chicago academic literature, of which How Chicago will proba-
bly be the rallying point. Further, despite the Chicago School's general
academic influence, law students-the future crop of judges, politi-
cians, academics, and enforcers-are increasingly being exposed to
post-Chicago views without much of a current Chicago counterpunch.
Of the eight major antitrust casebooks, only Posner and Easter-
70 In the preface to the 2001 second edition of Antitrust Law, Posner notes that contempo-
rary antitrust law is "largely though not entirely congruent with the principles set forth in the
first edition" of his book and that antitrust law has been "normalized" and "domesticated." Posn-
er, Antitrust Law at viii (cited in note 22). He characterizes the disputes between post-Chicago
and Chicago as niggling disagreements over emphasis. Id at vii-viii.
71 Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United States v.
Microsoft, 1 NYU J L & Liberty 167,201 (2005).
72 United States Postal Service v Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd, 540 US 736,748 (2004).
73 A partial list of recent, controversial, pro-plaintiff lower court decisions in which the
Supreme Court denied certiorari includes Dentsply International Inc v United States, 546 US
1089 (2006); Visa USA, Inc v United States, 543 US 811 (2004); 3M Co v LePage's Inc, 542 US 953
(2004); United States Tobacco Co v Conwood Co, 537 US 1148 (2003); C.R. Bard, Inc v M3 Sys-
tems, Inc, 526 US 1130 (1999).
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brook's, which is in the process of revision," is identifiably Chicago
School in its orientation.
Chicago's challenge is to revitalize its ideas and reenergize its
constituents given these background conditions. At present, Chicago's
strongholds are the Supreme Court, the enforcement agencies, and
antitrust practitioners. In the long run, it cannot hold the fort without
attracting a new generation of scholars to defend and refine its central
ideas in the academy and present them to the next generation of
judges, enforcers, and practitioners.
B. Empiricism
Neo-Chicago is unlikely to succeed by merely bolstering Chicago
School tenets on theoretical grounds. Sooner or later, post-Chicago
will have to supply the empirical evidence that is assumed in, but
largely absent from, its attacks on Chicago. For the reasons previously
identified, post-Chicago will continue to make only minor dents in
Chicagoan dogma so long as it continues to engage Chicago in a theo-
retical tit-for-tat. When post-Chicago begins to put more muscle into
an empirical attack, Chicago will need to respond in kind.
The dominant trend in the legal academy is toward empirical le-
gal studies. Antitrust cannot stay on the sidelines for long. At the first
three annual conferences on empirical legal studies (held at Texas,
NYU, and Cornell in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively) antitrust was
completely absent from the programs.7 Neither Chicago nor post-
Chicago seems eager to join the empiricist bandwagon. There is an
opportunity for entrepreneurial scholars from either camp to begin
serious programs of empirical work on antitrust.
There is no lack of promising empirical projects awaiting a cham-
pion. The Supreme Court's recent jettisoning of the rule of per se ille-
gality for vertical resale price maintenance 6 opens the door to study
modern RPM, particularly given changes in the rules of distribution
brought about by retail consolidation and the Internet. Similarly, the
abrogation of the rule of per se illegality for patent tie-ins," the continu-
74 Frank H. Easterbrook, Richard A. Posner, and Andrew M. Rosenfield, Antitrust: Cases,
Economic Notes and Other Materials (West forthcoming).
75 First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Texas, online at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2005/112805_black.html (visited Apr 7, 2009); Second Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, NYU, online at http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/cels (visited
Apr 7, 2009); Third Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell, online at
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/cels2008/Schedule.cfm (visited Apr 7,2009).
76 See Leegin, 127 S Ct at 2725 (2007) (holding that vertical price restraints should be
judged by the rule of reason, not the per se rule), overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park
& Sons Co, 220 US 373 (1911).
77 See note 68.
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ing battle over pharmaceutical patent settlements,78 and the purposes
and effects of allegedly exclusionary distribution strategies (like bun-
dling, tying, and exclusive dealing) all provide fodder for interesting
empirical projects. The fields are ripe but the laborers few. Both Chica-
go and its detractors have an opportunity and a need to fill this void.
C. Renewing the Articles of Faith
Empiricism has its limits in antitrust, as it does everywhere else.
Many antitrust judgments are not Popperian-they cannot be falsified
or proven." Instead, they rest on informed intuitions about the com-
parative success and failure rates of markets and courts. At its core, the
Chicago School espoused two articles of faith: (1) markets are robust
when it comes to competition; and (2) courts are infirm when it comes to
policing competition. Post-Chicago has largely concentrated its attack on
the first article, assuming that the comparative superiority of courts will
become evident if the depth of market failure can be demonstrated.
Chicago is likely to find a world increasingly disinclined to accept
its articles of faith. The nerve-rattling financial crisis triggered in 2008
has made even erstwhile libertarians and rabid anti-antitrusters like
Alan Greenspan" reconsider their priors.8' Richard Posner's hastily
written post-mortem-A Failure of Capitalism -blames the recent
depression (as he styles it) on under-regulation." Never mind that the
financial crisis had little to do with competition policy. If the relevant
category is "faith in markets," Chicago faces a tremendous challenge
maintaining adherents in the coming years.
This suggests that Chicago is most likely to succeed if it spends
the immediate future rearticulating its second article of faith. Some
competitive practices that cause harm cannot be controlled without
78 Some of the little empirical work that is being done today in antitrust is being conducted
on patent settlements between branded and generic drug manufacturers. See generally C. Scott
Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements between Rivals: A Survey, online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=969492 (visited April 7, 2009) (analyzing
thirty settlements involving drug companies and concluding that (1) antitrust activity has in-
creased, (2) repeat players have emerged, and (3) settlements have become more sophisticated).
79 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery chs 3-4 (Routledge 2002) (Karl
Popper, et al, trans).
80 See Alan Greenspan, Antitrust, in Ayn Rand, ed, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 56, 58
(New American Library 1967) (characterizing antitrust as "reminiscent of Alice's Wonderland"
and "utter nonsense").
81 Patrice Hill, Congress Rips Greenspan for Crisis, Wash Times Al (Oct 24,2008) (report-
ing that the former Federal Reserve chairman testified before Congress that his former faith in
self-regulation had been "flawed").
U See generally Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the Des-
cent into Depression (2009).
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doing damage to similar competitive practices that do good." Further,
Chicago might argue, the good that would be chilled through aggres-
sive antitrust enforcement is often greater than the bad that would be
prevented. In this sense, regulating competitive behavior is much like
regulating speech. There is no doubt that some words break bones
every bit as much as sticks and stones, but ceding censorial authority
to the government poses a danger to valuable speech as well. It is in
forms of rhetoric like this that Chicago is mostly likely to preserve
some of its momentum in the challenging environment ahead.
CONCLUSION
How Chicago arrives at an opportune time. President Barack
Obama (a Chicago Law School professor but hardly a "Chicagoan")
campaigned on a platform of renewed antitrust enforcement, 8 and the
financial crisis will prompt greater scrutiny of free-market positions.
One hopes that the book will be taken as a correction of Chicago's
errors rather than a wholesale abandonment of Chicago's legacy. As
most of the book's authors assume or overtly say, Chicago left anti-
trust enforcement far better off than it found it. If Chicago's successor
cannot say the same, it will be counted a failure.
83 See Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 223 (1993)
(observing that above-cost predation may be "beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal
to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting").
84 See Jeff Mason, Obama Eyes Media with Promise of Antitrust Push, Reuters (May 18,
2008) (reporting that presidential candidate Obama stated on the campaign trail: "We're going to
have an antitrust division in the Justice Department that actually believes in antitrust law. We
haven't had that for the last seven, eight years.").
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